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ADD: Lessons from the UK 
 
 
Dominic Maxwell and Will Paxton 
 
 
The UK’s matched savings scheme is growing rebellious. Inspired by the American 
Dream Demonstration (ADD), the UK is now on its second set of pilots – but the 
subtle differences introduced in the first set are becoming gradually more pronounced. 
The programme is growing up, asserting its independence from its American parents 
and experiencing all the angst of adolescence.  
 
The differences between the US and the UK are particularly concentrated in the role 
of community organisations, the match rate, and restrictions on how the money is 
used. This paper asks what lessons are revealed by these three US/UK differences. In 
asking, it becomes apparent that there is a fundamental question over the purpose of 
matched savings accounts: are they intended to develop a savings habit, build up an 
asset stock, or assist the purchase of specific items?  In the UK, the emphasis is more 
on the savings habit and the assets buffer than it appears to be in America, but in 
different areas of programme design the tensions between objectives are acute. 
 
Box 1: About the Saving Gateway (SG) 
 
The first round of pilots in the Saving Gateway (SG1) was explicitly inspired by the 
American Dream Demonstration. Of the five different pilots, four were run in 
partnership with community-based organisations and were linked to financial 
education. 
 
But from the start, there were important differences between the American and British 
versions. The match rate for the Saving Gateway was only 1:1, and there were no 
restrictions on how the money could be spent. The Saving Gateway was on a smaller 
scale, run in only five locations with a total of 1,500 participants. Participants could 
save up to £25 per month, with a total maximum over 18 months of £375.  
 
In early 2005 a second round of pilots was launched (SG2). SG2 increased the 
number of locations from five to six, the number of people from 1,500 to 20,000, and 
the maximum income from $15,000 ($27,300) to £25,000 ($45,500).1 The second 
round of pilots also varies the match rate, with pilots at 1:1, 1:2 and 1:5. The last 
account will graduate the programme at the end of 2006, although they will 
automatically stay open (without matching) after this time. 
 
1. The role of community organisations 
 
Four of the five pilots in the first round had heavy involvement from community 
organisations. Three were housing associations (non-profit providers of social 
housing, funded by government), and one, Toynbee Hall, was a community anti-
poverty organisation, similar to - and in fact the inspiration for – Chicago’s Hull 
House. These organisations recruited participants, fielded enquiries, helped clients fill 
                                                 
1 Exchange rate correct as at 10/6/05 
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in forms, and ran complementary financial education. The fifth pilot, in Hull, simply 
sent potential participants a letter from central government informing them of their 
eligibility and inviting them to contact the bank.  
 
The community organisations certainly provided an important service. They were able 
to recruit participants who were more deprived than in Hull, with twice as many 
having a household income over £100 per week, and less than half as many earning 
over £200 per week. Hull participants were less likely to be unemployed and looking 
for work (although they were more likely to be unable to work due to ill health), and 
were 17 percentage points more likely to have a current account before joining (87 per 
cent compared to 71 per cent).  
 
But the organisations’ involvement was still shallow compared to similar 
organisations in the ADD. The pilots were designed by the Treasury, their timing and 
size dictated, and the space in which organisations could innovate was tightly 
constrained, rarely extending beyond recruitment and education. Rather than 
submitting proposals for funding, organisations were invited to bid for a contract. The 
initiative, in other words, ran in the opposite direction. 
 
For the second round of pilots, SG2, the role of community organisations will be 
reduced still further. Recruitment will be along the lines of the Hull technique, 
sending letters and waiting for participants to present themselves. Every pilot site has 
locally-provided financial education linked to the SG, but providers are unable to use 
the government list of eligible individuals and so are unable to contact participants 
directly. 
 
SG2 is designed to be one step closer to a national roll-out, and it was thought that the 
community-led model did not offer a realistic pathway to scale. The voluntary and 
community sector often fills a different function in Britain than America, focusing 
less on the direct provision of welfare. Certainly government-funded faith-based 
initiatives, such as those developed by President Bush, are absent in Britain (at least 
partly because the government itself provides greater levels of support). Social 
housing organisations could in theory fill some of the gap, but although every area has 
some provision of social housing, this is sometimes through the independent housing 
associations and sometimes through local government, varying street to street 
according to local history and circumstances. The large housing associations have 
increasingly good coverage, but still only include part of the social housing sector. 
Focusing just on housing associations would also exclude many thousands of people 
who would benefit from the programme but do not live in social housing: according to 
one study, half the poor are homeowners (Burrows and Wilcox 2000). 
 
Rolling out the community-led model would also be far more expensive. In the long 
run the extra innovation may make it a price worth paying, but it is plausible that the 
benefits of innovation decline as thinking on individual development accounts 
becomes more mature. If this is true, then the best course of action may be to move 
from a highly localised structure, such as ADDs, to a more centralised one as time 
passes.  
 
The involvement of community organisations, then, may be a necessary casualty.  The 
calculation must take account of how important it is to provide a pathway to scale, 
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how much innovation community groups provide, whether there are alternative ways 
of recruiting poorer and more deprived individuals, and to what extent policy-makers 
are willing to divert resources from asset-building towards the broader education and 
involvement that community organisations can deliver. 
 
2. How high a match? 
 
The match rate of SG1 was relatively low compared to many ADD programmes, at 
1:1. SG2 is even lower, varying down to 1:5.  Is that too low? Are the Brits just 
mean? To think about what the “correct” match rate might be, we need to look again 
at the basic motivations for the programme, and at the possible distortions the match 
might induce. 
 
As mentioned above, the motivation for SG puts more emphasis on process than the 
American equivalents do: the point is not simply to own an asset, but to develop a 
savings habit. If developing a habit were the sole motivation, then the match rate 
ought logically to be as low as is consistent with encouraging participation. Given the 
extra opportunity cost of saving for the poor, and the extra institutional and cultural 
barriers that may prevent them starting, this motivation would also suggest that the 
poorer the target group, the higher the match rate that is needed.  
 
The 1:1 match rate of SG1 does appear to have been high enough to kick-start a 
savings habit. Participants made a deposit on average in 71 per cent of months, and 
depth interviews for evaluation indicated that most participants developed savings 
habits they were reluctant to break, so saved even when they had difficulties. Three 
months after the programme finished, 91 per cent still had their account open and 41 
per cent were still saving regularly. Many of those who were continuing to save 
attributed it to the routine that they had developed through SG (Kempson et al 2005). 
 
In fact, the 1:1 may if anything have been too high, slowing recruitment with 
suspicions that the offer is “too good to be true”. Recruitment in Hull increased when 
the government logo was made larger, perhaps suggesting that potential participants 
were in need of reassurance. The following quotes from participants, taken from 
evaluation interviews, are enlightening:  
 
I read the stuff first and I was a bit, it seemed too good to be true at first. 
When they say the government will double your money, it just seems too good 
to be true. I was looking for the small print. 
 
As soon as I read that you were going to get 100% profit on the money paid in, 
I mean everybody I have spoken to about it says ‘Where is the catch?’ I said ‘I 
don’t know, I’m frightened to death what the catch might be’. 
Kempson et al, 2005: 35 
 
If people are “frightened to death” that the offer is too attractive, it is not hard to 
imagine a smaller match rate being at least as effective. So the UK experience 
suggests a match rate of 1:1 is certainly high enough, and may be too high. The 
second pilots will show us the effect of a lower rate: who (if anyone) will reduce their 
saving habit in response, and who will not participate at all?  
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A second motivation of the programme might be to provide individuals with the 
security and other benefits that come from asset ownership – the set of benefits known 
as “the asset effect”. By preventing the worst vulnerabilities of poverty, assets are 
thought to be able to increase the propensity to plan, the ability to take productive 
risks, and the strength of “self-efficacy” – the extent to which individuals feel they 
can change their own situations through their actions. SG1 gives some support to this 
idea: 29 per cent, for example, agreed or agreed strongly with that participation had 
left them “more in control of my own life” (50 per cent neither agreed nor disagreed). 
 
Crucially, though, other research appears to suggest that there is a relatively low cut-
off point, around £300-£600 ($550-$1,100), after which extra savings do not bring 
extra benefits (Bynner and Paxton 2001). The asset effect is an important justification 
for state involvement: by pointing out the effects on planning, vulnerability and 
attitudes, narrow interpretations of microeconomic analysis can be exposed as 
incomplete. But once participants own more than £300-£600, if it is true that the asset 
effect fades, it becomes much easier to argue that the decision to save or spend money 
should be left to the individual. How this target figure gets translated into a match rate 
depends, of course, on the length of the programme and the monthly maximum, but 
the SG’s overall limit of £375 appears sufficient. 
 
Finally, the motivation might be to help individuals to pay for specific purchases, 
such as a house or education. In that case, the match is in some ways more similar to a 
subsidy for that particular good, rather than just a savings policy, and the appropriate 
match would depend on the social benefit that the good provides. 
 
Turning to distortions, the higher the match rate, the more incentive it provides to 
borrow in order to make deposits. The UK experience with a 1:1 match is 
encouraging on this: less than 0.5 per cent said they had funded their deposits through 
commercial borrowing, although 3 per cent borrowed from a family or friend and 5 
per cent transferred money from a savings account. Again, it will be interesting to see 
how these figures vary under the different match rates in SG2. 
 
3. Restrictions or no restrictions? 
 
The Brits are mean with their match rates, but generous with their lack of restrictions: 
after going through SG, participants can spend all the accumulated funds on whatever 
they see fit. This partly reflects the emphasis on the savings process, promoting a 
savings habit rather than a stock of wealth. It is also made more possible by the lower 
match rate. Yet the contrast between Britain and America is still instructive, with 
many people finishing SG with no clear idea of what the funds will be used for.  
 
How well used are the funds? Do they actually remain as a savings buffer, or are they 
all spent straight away? The graph below shows the spending/saving intentions of 
participants, as reported in the questionnaire at completion (Kempson et al 2001: 77).  
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This graph tells us that the majority of people (depending on how much they saved) 
were left with some asset base at the end of the programme. This would be consistent 
with the idea of assets as a reserve, bringing security and allowing people to plan 
ahead: the asset is providing a valuable benefit even if it is not being used. The 
interim evaluation of SG1 pointed out that those intending to keep their money for a 
rainy day were the largest group. Most, but “by no means all” of these people had 
identified themselves as rainy-day savers at the start of the programme (Kempson et 
al 2003). It should be noted, though, that only thirty people were interviewed in depth 
and those intending to keep their money would be a still smaller subgroup. 
 
The money that was withdrawn may or may not have been well used – the graph 
alone is unable to help us. If all participants withdrew their money for day-to-day 
living expenses then the programme would have failed to promote wider asset 
ownership. If, on the other hand, it was spent on education or lumpy purchases (such 
as a cooker), and/or a broader savings habit had been developed, then it certainly 
would be a success. Of those who were interviewed in depth for the interim 
evaluation, those who intended to spend all the money (both savings and match) were 
most likely to be saving for a holiday; others wanted things for their home that they 
could not otherwise afford; one person was saving up to replace her car. The small 
sample size is again important.  
 
While a holiday may not be the most socially-desirable purchase, in general there is 
not a clear boundary between “worthy” and “unworthy”, whether this is interpreted as 
“investment” versus “consumption”, or smoothing versus everyday expenditure. A 
purchase for one person may be an important way of smoothing a crisis and 
preventing unsustainable debt spirals, but the same purchase by someone in different 
circumstances may be part of regular spending. Similarly, it may be an important 
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investment in personal development, or a luxury with no long-term benefits – a car, 
for example, could be either, depending on whether it is purchased to travel to work 
or cruise the high street. Without also knowing the wider circumstances, it is hard for 
researchers (or those who design restrictions) to see in advance how well the money is 
being used. 
 
What the graph does tell us, though, is that a high proportion of people had no specific 
plans for their savings, particularly if those who “cannot say” are interpreted as not 
having plans. It would be a reasonable conjecture that restrictions would put people 
off participating either if they had firm intentions that were not permitted by the 
restrictions, or if they had no plans for the money but wished to preserve flexibility. 
Imposing restrictions could then reduce the ability of the programme to promote a 
savings habit by reducing the number of people who wish to take part. 
 
 
4. Conclusion and next steps 
 
The close similarities between the US and the UK programmes make the differences 
all the more enlightening. Some of them can be explained by their different social and 
political environments. The reduced role of trusted intermediaries, for example, is at 
least partly a response to a different structure of community organisations in the UK. 
But the UK’s experience still poses some challenges for schemes in other countries, 
and still has much to learn from the ADD and its equivalents. On community 
organisations, a more centralised structure may offer greater cost efficiency and a 
clearer route to national roll-out, but possibly at the expense of innovation. The match 
rate of 1:1 appears sufficient to provoke a savings habit – and higher rates than this 
run a greater risk of introducing distortions, such as commercial borrowing to take 
advantage of the match. The second round of pilots, due to finish at the end of 2007, 
will show to what extent the match can be reduced still further without reducing 
effectiveness. And finally, on restrictions, the UK’s experience suggest that many 
people enter the programme with no fixed ideas as to how to spend their savings, and 
preserving sufficient flexibility to allow this may be important  for recruitment. How 
these various tensions are resolved depends on how we balance the different 
motivations for matched savings. 
 
The second round of pilots will allow us to examine these issues in more depth. 
Depending on their results, we will see whether the UK’s small divergence is 
temporary – a soul-searching adolescence followed by a return to the family traditions 
– or a longer-term parting of ways. Either way, transatlantic conversations are likely 
to be mutually productive for a considerable time to come, and the Centre for Social 
Development has our gratitude for its continuing role in arranging them.  
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